The "Bernstein doctrine" is a classic example of the exception swallowing the rule. The Bernstein exception allows the Executive to intercede in act of state cases when it determines that adjudication would not harm U.S.-foreign relations. The Exception was initially intended solely to permit victims of Nazi war crimes to recover in United States courts. However, in the more than 50 years since its inception, the Bernstein doctrine has expanded far beyond its original intended purpose, and as a result, has created a host of constitutional and political dilemmas. The Bernstein exception violates the separation of powers doctrine by giving the Executive, through the State Department, unchecked power to determine the outcome of act of state cases brought in United States courts. This power has in turn been used by the Bush Administration to intercede on behalf of powerful, multi-national corporations in suits brought by individual plaintiffs, who are often the victims of international human rights abuses at the hands of these politically-connected corporations. Moreover, the Bernstein exception is another means by which the current Administration can further unconstitutionally expand its power in the purported "war on terror." The Executive has succeeded in having cases dismissed simply by making an unsubstantiated observation that adjudication in a U.S. court might have a negative effect on the particular foreign government's continued cooperation in the "war on terror." Consequently, this article argues that the Bernstein exception should be abolished. The judiciary is quite capable of determining the applicability of the act of state doctrine without intervention by the Executive. While the Executive's views regarding the impact of a particular case on U.S.-foreign relations may well be informative, its opinion cannot be dispositive.
Introduction
Under the act of state doctrine, a United States court will abstain from adjudicating claim where the relief sought requires the court to declare invalid the official act of a foreign government committed within its own country.
1 The "Bernstein exception," however, gives the Executive Branch discretion to waive the act of state doctrine when the State Department issues a letter informing the court that "it has no objection on foreign relations grounds to adjudication of the validity of a given act of a foreign state." 2 In essence, a "Bernstein letter," which takes its name from the 1954 case in which it was first used, 3 is the Executive's declaration that adjudicating the claim would not damage United States-foreign relations. 4 In more recent cases, the use of Bernstein letters has largely been substituted with either a "statement of interest" 5 or a brief submitted to the court by the Department of Justice. 6 The argument in favor of the Bernstein exception is that the Executive is in the best position to judge the effect on foreign relations of adjudicating the validity of the act of a foreign sovereign in an American court. 7 In fact, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Executive Branch has primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs under the constitutional separation of powers. 8 Additionally, the Court has recognized that the Executive Branch has superior institutional resources for examining and assessing diplomatic matters. 9 A court performs the same assessment, only less efficiently, by ascertaining executive policy through its own independent investigation. 10 Accordingly, once the Executive has assessed the possibility of interference with foreign relations caused by disposition of an act of state case, a
Bernstein letter is the most efficient way for a court to gauge the Executive's position on foreign policy. 11 Furthermore, allowing the Executive, rather than the Judiciary, to determine whether to adjudicate these cases avoids possible embarrassment to the Executive in its conduct of international affairs.
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On the other hand, application of the Bernstein exception creates a number of potentially serious problems. Although the Supreme Court has addressed the Bernstein exception in three separate cases, it has neither resolved the continuing validity of this exception, nor has a majority of the court ever endorsed the exception. 13 This has created uncertainty in the lower federal courts as to the weight, if any, to give to a Bernstein letter in a particular case. Some district courts have adopted the exception, treating a Bernstein letter as dispositive, while other courts have not.
14 Still other courts simply consider the letter from the State Department as merely one factor to be considered when determining whether to apply the act of state doctrine. 15 Some district courts even consider the absence of a Bernstein letter as an implied mandate to apply the act of state doctrine. 16 This inconsistency in applying the Bernstein exception has at times resulted in contradictory, even absurd, results in comparable cases.
17 10 See id. 11 See id. at 768. 12 See Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. at 320. 13 See supra note 1. 14 See supra note 5. 15 See id. 16 Even more troubling, the Bernstein exception violates the doctrine of separation of powers between the branches of government because it gives a degree of control over the outcome of cases to the Executive through the Department of State. When the district court relies upon a Bernstein letter to waive application of the act of state doctrine, it "allows the Executive in effect to replace the court as the decision maker in the case." 18 If, on the other hand, the court disregards a Bernstein letter and finds the act of state doctrine applicable despite the State Department's views to the contrary, it could lead to serious embarrassment of the Executive in the arena of foreign affairs.
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Unquestioning adherence to the views of the Executive in applying the act of state doctrine also politicizes the judicial branch by treating similarly situated litigants unequally.
Justice Brennan pointed out that adopting the Bernstein exception would subject "the fate of the individual claimant . . . to the political considerations of the Executive Branch." 20 As a result, "similarly situated litigants would not be likely to obtain even-handed treatment," depending upon the litigant's relative influence with the Administration in power at the time.
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In addition, the Bernstein exception has the potential to be used as a means for the Executive to further increase its power and expand its control over foreign affairs in its declared proceed because the counterclaimant had obtained a Bernstein letter, whereas the court remanded the second case to determine the Executive's views because the counterclaimant in that case failed to obtain such a letter). 18 Id. at 375. 19 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432-433 (1964) ("If the Executive Branch has undertaken negotiations with an expropriating country, but has refrained from claims of violation of the law of nations, a determination to that effect by a court might be regarded as a serious insult. . . . Considerably more serious and far-reaching consequences would flow from a judicial finding that international law standards had been met if that determination flew in the face of a State Department proclamation to the contrary. . . . In short, whatever way the matter is cut, the possibility of conflict between the Judicial and Executive Branches could hardly be avoided."). 20 First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 791-792 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 21 Id.
"war on terror." 22 For example, if a litigant brought suit in a United States court based on an official act of a foreign government which the Executive had deemed a "supporter of terrorism," the Executive would have the power to influence the result by advocating waiver of the act of state doctrine in a Bernstein letter. Conversely, if a litigant brought suit against a favored sovereign, the Executive could potentially control the outcome by refusing to write a Bernstein letter or by actively urging the court to dismiss the case. 
I. History and Background
The act of state doctrine bars U.S. courts from hearing claims based on acts of foreign governments. 25 The Bernstein exception, however, gives the Executive Branch discretion to waive the act of state doctrine expressing its view that adjudicating the claim would not damage A.
History of the Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine has traditionally provided that acts of a foreign sovereign within its own territory are not subject to judicial examination and must be presumed valid.
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The 64 The court of appeals, however, adhered to its original decision that the act of state doctrine should be applied to City Bank's counterclaim, and awarded the $1.8 million to Banco Nacional. 65 In reaching its holding, the court of appeals distinguished
Bernstein on the fact that the State Department's letter in that case expressed a policy of compensating all victims of Nazi expropriations, not just those fortunate enough to be able to assert counterclaims, and the fact that the act of state in Bernstein was perpetrated by a foreign government that was no longer in existence. 66 On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, but no opinion commanded a majority of the Court, and six of the nine Justices agreed with the lower court that the Bernstein exception should be rejected. Rehnquist determined that because the State Department had advised the Court that its foreign interests would not be frustrated in the case, the act of state doctrine should not prevent the Court from examining the legal issues raised by the acts of the foreign sovereign within its own territory. 71 Justice Rehnquist concluded that when the Executive urges that the act of state doctrine not be applied, the rationale for application of the act is eliminated:
It would be wholly illogical to insist that such a rule, fashioned because of fear that adjudication would interfere with the conduct of foreign relations, be applied in the face of an assurance from that branch of the Federal Government that conducts foreign relations that such a result would not obtain. Justice Brennan further contended that the act of state doctrine was the expression of a number of policies to which the Bernstein exception and Justice Douglas' "fairness exception"
were not responsive. Justice Brennan cited such policies as the preferability of comprehensive relief through diplomatic channels over piecemeal adjudications by the judiciary, and the inadvisability of national courts passing on the legality of an expropriation without accepted standards of decision supplied by a treaty or by customary international law. 95 Finally, Justice Upon the district court's request, the State Department filed multiple statements of interest in the case, in which it urged against adjudication of the lawsuits. 186 The Executive first claimed that it had "many tools at its disposal to promote adherence to human rights in 197 See supra note 108 at 662 ("It is evident that the Bernstein exception cannot genuinely be supported in the name of separation of powers, because the operation of the exception itself creates grave separation of powers problems."). 198 First Nat'l City Bank at 790; see also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 725 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that six members of the Court had disapproved the Bernstein exception because "the task of defining the role of the judiciary is for this court, not the Executive Branch"). 199 See supra note 17 at 376.
However, when a court defers to a Bernstein letter, it abdicates this independence and discretion to the Executive. 200 The Bernstein exception only makes sense if the primary rationale for the act of state doctrine is comity in international relations and between the branches of government. 201 In fact, Justice Rehnquist's three-justice plurality opinion's endorsement of the Bernstein exception in
First National City Bank depended heavily upon principles of international comity and judicial deference to the exclusive power of the Executive in the field of foreign relations. 202 However, in its more recent application of the act of state doctrine, there has been a "shift by the Court away from the international comity rationale in favor of a rationale grounded in separation of The courts are similarly deferential when the Executive requests that the court avoid adjudication because of a claimed interference with foreign relations. 211 The Restatement, after reviewing cases in which the State Department had stated a position on application of the act of state doctrine, concludes: "It seems that if the State Department issues a letter requesting that the courts not review the validity of a particular act, such a letter will be highly persuasive if not binding." 212 Additionally, there has not been "a single case in which a court permitted a lawsuit to proceed in the face of an expression of concern" by the Executive regarding the effect of the adjudication of the case on foreign relations. 213 Further, when a Bernstein letter is accorded dispositive effect, a court must pass on the legality of an act of state under international law regardless of the sensitivity of the subject to national or ideological goals, the lack of accepted standards of decision, and the possibility of embarrassment among the three coordinate branches of the national government. 214 For example, when the legality of a particular act is a politically sensitive issue, such as was the expropriation of American property during the Cuban revolution, and when the Executive and/or
Congress has taken a strong position, a court attempting to decide the issue would be under pressure to reach a particular result. 215 In such a case, either way the court decided, it would face undesirable consequences. If it concluded that an expropriation without compensation was legal under customary international law, there would be a serious risk of embarrassment to both the court and its coordinate branches. 216 If it reached a result harmonious with the position of the political branches and held the nationalization illegal, the court would risk appearing to have compromised its position as an impartial tribunal. 217 Further, the Executive's determination that adjudication would not interfere with foreign relations is "often short-sighted and . In addition, the Bernstein exception has the potential to be used as a means for the Executive to further increase its power and expand its control over foreign affairs in its declared "war on terror." As an example, if a litigant brought suit in a United States court based on an official act of a disfavored foreign government which the Executive had deemed a "supporter of terrorism," such as Sudan, the Executive has the power to influence the result by advocating waiver of the act of state doctrine in a Bernstein letter. Conversely, if a litigant brought suit against a favored sovereign, the Executive could control the outcome by refusing to write a Bernstein letter or by actively urging the court to dismiss the case. 244 The current administration's zealous intervention in act of state cases by means of statements of interest is fueled in part by the desire to expand its control over all aspects of foreign affairs. 245 The Bush Administration, particularly since September 11 th , 2001, has sought to expand its executive power by claiming that various lawsuits might have some negative impact on foreign affairs. 246 One of the most common arguments made in these act of state cases is that adjudication would cause the foreign sovereign to cease cooperating with the U.S. in the "war on terror." 247 The Bush Administration particularly opposes individual human rights cases 
IV. Abolishing the Bernstein Exception
The Bernstein exception should be abolished because significant foreign policy considerations should not be evaluated by the judiciary on a case-by-case basis; it is simply too risky for the judicial branch to declare foreign acts of state unlawful. The judiciary has recognized the peril in declaring illegal the actions of foreign sovereigns taken within its own territory:
When the courts engage in piecemeal adjudication of the legality of the sovereign acts of states, they risk disruption of our country's international diplomacy. The executive may utilize protocol, economic sanction, compromise, delay, and persuasion to achieve international objectives. Ill-timed judicial decisions challenging the acts of foreign states could nullify these tools and embarrass the United States in the eyes of the world.
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If the Bernstein exception were disallowed, the judiciary would independently determine whether to apply the act of state doctrine, rather than depending upon a pronouncement (or lack thereof) from the Executive. 
V. Conclusion
Because of the multitude of serious constitutional problems caused by the Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine, the United States Supreme Court should abolish the doctrine. There are various means by which the Executive can express its views on the impact of a particular case on United States foreign relations without the negative implications caused by a Bernstein letter.
